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IN NEED OF CLARIFICATION: A CALL TO DEFINE 
THE SCOPE OF THE ROUTINE BOOKING 
EXCEPTION BY ADOPTING THE LEGITIMATE 
ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION TEST 
By Elizabeth Parrish+ 
Legal scholar Akhil Amar has stated that “[t]he self-incrimination clause of 
the Fifth Amendment is an unsolved riddle of vast proportions, a Gordian knot 
in the middle of our Bill of Rights.”1  One strand of the Fifth Amendment’s 
protection against self-incrimination currently confusing both scholars and 
courts alike is the so-called routine booking exception to Miranda v. Arizona’s 
protection against compelled statements during custodial interrogations.2 
After an arrest, law enforcement must routinely ask a suspect certain 
questions, such as their name, address, and birth date.3  Traditionally, courts 
have excepted these booking questions from the procedural requirements 
                                                            
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2014, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
B.A., 2009, The College of William & Mary.  The author wishes to thank her colleagues on the 
Catholic University Law Review for their valuable work on this Comment, as well as her family 
and friends for their support throughout law school. 
 1. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST 
PRINCIPLES 46 (1997); see also George C. Thomas III & Mark Greenbaum, Justice Story Cuts the 
Gordian Knot of Hung Jury Instructions, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 893, 893 (2007) (defining 
a “common law Gordian Knot” as “a doctrine so complex and inconsistent that it provides little 
guidance to judges and often blinds them to the perversity of the way the doctrine works”); 
Steven C. Sparling, Note, Cutting the Gordian Knot: Resolution of the Sentencing Dispute Over 
Dismissed Charges After United States v. Watts, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1073, 1073 n.8 (1998) 
(“According to legend, the Gordian knot was tied by Gordius, King of Phrygia.  Only the future 
ruler of Asia could untie the knot; Alexander the Great cut the knot with his sword.  In modern 
parlance it means an intricate problem.”). 
 2. See Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (agreeing with the 
State’s contention “that ‘booking exception cases around the country are confusing and 
conflicting’”), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 122 (2012); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, 
Alford, 358 S.W.3d 647 (No. 11-1318) (“Courts have adopted varying and inconsistent tests to 
determine whether a particular question falls within the routine booking exception.”); Megan S. 
Skelton & James G. Connell, III, The Routine Booking Question Exception to Miranda, 34 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 55, 74 (2004) (noting the existence of “confusion in the lower courts”). 
 3. See State v. Rheaume, 853 A.2d 1259, 1263 (Vt. 2004) (explaining that “identification 
of the arrested person is central to the police processing function”); Skelton & Connell, supra 
note 2, at 55.  Many states have enacted statutes mandating that officers collect specific 
information from arrestees.  For example, Connecticut requires officers to collect “definite 
information relative to the identity of each person so arrested.”  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.  
§ 29–11(a)(2) (West 2008).  Similarly, the Texas Administrative Code requires police to establish 
a file on each inmate upon intake.  37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE. § 265.4(a) (2008).  This file must 
include, among other information, the inmate’s name (including aliases), address, date of birth, 
and an inventory of the suspect’s property.  Id. 
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announced by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona.4  However, the 
question remains: how are police to proceed when “routine” questions could 
potentially elicit incriminating information from the suspect, thereby 
implicating the suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights?5 
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court explained that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination requires that police advise a suspect of 
certain rights in order to render  the suspect’s statement made during a 
custodial interrogation admissible in court.6  Since that decision, the Court has 
gradually restricted the scope of the doctrine by holding certain types of 
custodial interrogations exempt from Miranda’s procedural requirements.7  For 
example, during the mid-1970s, lower courts began to recognize a “routine 
booking question exception” to Miranda, concluding that suspects’ responses 
to police inquiries seeking biographical information during the booking 
process were admissible at trial absent a Miranda warning.8  The Supreme 
Court has addressed the exception in several opinions since Miranda, but has 
largely failed to define the exception’s scope.9 
The Supreme Court first suggested that an exception to Miranda may exist 
for routine booking questions in Rhode Island v. Innis, although the issue 
presented in that case was the definition of “interrogation” as used in 
Miranda.10  In defining that term, the court excluded routine booking 
questions, stating that “the term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only 
to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the 
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the 
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response 
from the suspect.”11  Ten years later in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, the Court 
specifically addressed the routine booking exception but provided no clear rule 
                                                            
 4. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990) (plurality opinion) 
(explaining that questions seeking only biographical data are exempted from the Miranda 
requirements). 
 5. Megan Skelton and James Connell describe several scenarios where such a problem 
may arise.  Skelton & Connell, supra note 2, at 55–56.  For example, “[i]f a driver’s license and 
social security card list two different names, the answer to ‘What is your name?’ could be used in 
a prosecution for obstruction of justice, forged documents, or any number of other crimes.”  Id. at 
55.  Similarly, a suspect’s answer to an officer’s inquiry about his address could incriminate him 
if police had recently conducted a search of the house and discovered evidence of criminal 
conduct therein.  Id. at 55–56. 
 6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966). 
 7. See JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, CONSTITUTIONAL EXCLUSION: THE RULES, RIGHTS, AND 
REMEDIES THAT STRIKE THE BALANCE BETWEEN FREEDOM AND ORDER 108–09 (2011); 
LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & MARY L. PITMAN, THE MIRANDA RULING: ITS PAST, PRESENT, 
AND FUTURE 117 (2010); Skelton & Connell, supra note 2, at 59. 
 8. See Skelton & Connell, supra note 2, at 60. 
 9. See id. at 56. 
 10. Id. at 62 (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)). 
 11. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (emphasis added). 
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or standard for when it should apply.12  A four-justice plurality merely 
concluded that police questions that are only asked “for record-keeping 
purposes” and that are “reasonably related to the police’s administrative 
concerns. . . . fall outside the protections of Miranda.”13 
Lower courts have consistently accepted the existence of a routine booking 
exception to Miranda, but remain “deeply divided” over the exception’s 
scope.14  Thus, a circuit split has emerged as courts attempt to identify the 
boundaries of the exception in light of the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in 
Innis and Muniz.15  Courts have developed three approaches for determining 
when the exception applies: a should-have-known test, an intent test, and a 
legitimate administrative function test.16 
Relying on language the Supreme Court used in Innis, the United States 
Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have 
applied an objective should-have-known standard, which requires an officer to 
give a Miranda warning when the officer should have known or expected that 
a booking question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.17  
The Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, relying on the Muniz plurality 
opinion, have adopted a subjective intent test, which requires an officer to give 
a Miranda warning only if the officer intends his inquiry to elicit incriminating 
information.18  Finally, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
                                                            
 12. Skelton & Connell, supra note 2, at 65 (citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 
600–01 (1990) (plurality opinion)). 
 13. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601–02. 
 14. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2. 
 15. See Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 658–59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), cert. denied, 133 
S.Ct. 122 (2012); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 9–10; Michelle Olsen, Circuit 
Split Watch: Miranda at Booking, APPELLATE DAILY (July 3, 2012, 7:21 AM), 
http://appellatedaily.blogspot.com/2012/07/circuit-split-watch-miranda-at-booking.html; see also 
infra Part I.C.1–3 (discussing the circuit split). 
 16. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 9–10. 
 17. See Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 658; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 10.  For 
example, the Second Circuit applied the should-have-known test in United States v. Rodriguez, 
concluding that “[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate that Agent Smith knew or should have 
known that evidence for an eventual prosecution would emerge from his administrative interview 
of Rodriguez.”  356 F.3d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 2004).  Several state high courts have also adopted the 
should-have-known test.  See, e.g., State v. Rossignol, 627 A.2d 524, 526 (Me. 1993) (explaining 
that the routine booking exception applies to administrative questions “not likely to elicit an 
incriminating response”). 
 18. See Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 659; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 12–13.  
For example, the Fifth Circuit applied the intent test in United States v. Virgen-Moreno, stating 
that “[t]he questions [went] beyond the routine booking question exception because they were 
designed to and indeed did elicit incriminatory admissions.”  265 F.3d 276, 294 (5th Cir. 2001).  
A few state high courts have also adopted the intent test.  See, e.g., State v. Chrisicos, 813 A.2d 
513, 516 (N.H. 2002) (noting that the question at issue did not qualify under the routine booking 
exception because it was designed to elicit an incriminating answer). 
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Circuit created a third test: the legitimate administrative function test.19  Under 
this approach a Miranda warning is not required if, from an objective 
standpoint, the booking inquiry is reasonably related to a legitimate 
administrative function or concern.20 
This Comment argues that the legitimate administrative function test is the 
proper test for determining whether an officer must give a Miranda warning 
during a routine booking inquiry and proposes two additional procedural 
safeguards to protect suspects from the possibility that law enforcement may 
abuse the exception.  Part I sets forth an overview of Miranda and its progeny 
and explores the development of the routine booking exception.  This Part then 
examines the circuit split over which test to apply when determining whether a 
police inquiry of a suspect satisfies the routine booking exception.  Part II 
evaluates each of the three proposed tests both in terms of the tests’ 
consistency with the Supreme Court’s previous pronouncements on the routine 
booking exception and the degree to which each test encourages administrative 
efficiency.  This  Part argues that the legitimate administrative function test is 
most consistent with Supreme Court precedent on the exception and best 
promotes administrative efficiency at the police station and in the courts.  
Finally, Part III proposes that the legitimate administrative function test should 
be adopted as the proper test because it best accords with the routine booking 
exception as initially conceived by the courts.  This Comment notes, however, 
that additional procedural safeguards are necessary to protect suspects from the 
possibility of abuse by law enforcement.  To qualify under the routine booking 
exception, the police must ask the question at issue at the station during the 
actual booking process and the question must seek information (whether 
strictly biographical in nature or not) required to complete routine booking 
paperwork. 
I.  THE EMERGENCE OF THE ROUTINE BOOKING EXCEPTION 
A.  Miranda’s Protection of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o person 
 . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”21  
                                                            
 19. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 14; see also United States v. Gaston, 357 
F.3d 77, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601–02 (1990) 
(plurality opinion)) (“[O]fficers asking routine booking questions ‘reasonably related to the 
police’s administrative concerns’ are not engaged in interrogation within Miranda’s meaning and 
therefore do not have to give Miranda warnings.”).  Most recently, the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals also adopted the legitimate administrative function test.  Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 659–60. 
 20. Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 659–60; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 14; see 
Gaston, 357 F.3d at 82 (concluding that the questions police posed to defendant Gaston regarding 
his address and home ownership status were sufficiently related to “administrative concerns” and 
thus did not require a Miranda warning). 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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The underlying rationale for the privilege against self-incrimination is to 
ensure that the government respects its citizens’ dignity and integrity.22  The 
framers originally established the privilege to prevent the government from 
forcing defendants to testify against themselves in court.23 
In 1966, the Supreme Court broadened the privilege to custodial 
interrogations in its landmark opinion Miranda v. Arizona, noting that “the 
coercion inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary 
and involuntary statements, and thus heightens the risk that an individual will 
not ‘be accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment . . . not to be 
compelled to incriminate himself.’”24  In addition to protecting a defendant 
from self-incrimination at trial, the Fifth Amendment also prevents the 
government from coercing pre-trial disclosures and later using those 
disclosures against the defendant at trial.25  Therefore, the Court held that in 
                                                            
 22. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (describing the privilege against  
self-incrimination as a “substantive right” against an expansion in scope of governmental power 
over its citizens); see Skelton & Connell, supra note 2, at 59 (arguing that Miranda warnings 
serve to protect a suspect’s dignity). 
 23. See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 7, at 111.  The inclusion of the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights specifically reflected “the Framers’ opposition to 
courts that relied upon compulsion to extract sworn testimony from witnesses in the hope that 
factual inquiries would uncover uncharged and entirely uncorroborated offenses against the 
declarant,” such as the infamous Star Chamber, an ecclesiastical court that was prominent in 
England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  Geoffrey B. Fehling, Note, Verdugo, 
Where’d You Go?: Stoot v. City of Everett and Evaluating Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination 
Civil Liability Violations, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 481, 488 (2011); see Doe v. United States, 
487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988) (“Historically, the privilege was intended to prevent the use of legal 
compulsion to extract from the accused a sworn communication of facts which would incriminate 
him.  Such was the process of the ecclesiastical courts and the Star Chamber . . . .”).  Chief Justice 
Warren specifically referred to the Star Chamber in the Miranda opinion, describing the trial of 
John Lilburn in the Star Chamber as “the critical historical event shedding light on [the privilege 
against self-incrimination’s] origins and evolution.”  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459.  For a detailed 
recounting of John Lilburn’s trial and the resulting events, see Jeffrey M. Feldman & Stuart A. 
Ollanik, Compelling Testimony in Alaska: The Coming Rejection of Use and Derivative Use 
Immunity, 3 ALASKA L. REV. 229, 233–35 (1986). 
 24. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
439).  The Court was particularly concerned about law enforcement’s increasing use of 
psychologically coercive techniques during custodial interrogations.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448.  
The Court took note of language from various police manuals that suggested conducting 
interrogation in the investigator’s office so as to deprive the subject of any psychological 
advantage he or she may have otherwise possessed.  See id. at 449.  The manuals further dictated 
that “[t]he guilt of the subject is to be posited as a fact” and that officers should “minimize the 
moral seriousness of the offense,” instead “[casting] blame on the victim or on society.”  Id. at 
450.  The Court concluded that it is obvious that the type of interrogation environment created by 
these policies only serves “to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner.”  Id. at 457. 
 25. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 7, at 111.  The historical context underlying Miranda sheds 
light on the Court’s reasoning.  The Warren Court decided Miranda at the height of a period 
where the Court was subjecting police practices to increasing scrutiny, thereby expanding the 
constitutional protections available to criminal suspects.  Michael J. Roth, Note, Berkemer 
Revisited: Uncovering the Middle Ground Between Miranda and the New Terry, 77 FORDHAM L. 
1092 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 62:1087 
order to render a suspect’s statement made during a custodial interrogation 
admissible in court, police must advise the suspect “that he has a right to 
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence 
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either 
retained or appointed.”26  Without such a warning, any self-incriminating 
statements a suspect makes are in violation of the suspect’s constitutional 
rights and thus are inadmissible in court as evidence of guilt.27 
Since this decision, the Supreme Court has gradually restricted the doctrine’s 
scope by holding certain types of custodial interrogations exempt from 
Miranda’s procedural requirements.28  For example, in New York v. Quarles, 
the Court created a public safety exception by holding that it is not necessary 
for police to give a suspect a Miranda warning before questioning when the 
inquiry is “reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.”29  
Similarly, the Court has ruled that an undercover police officer posing as an 
inmate does not need to give a Miranda warning before asking an imprisoned 
suspect questions that could elicit incriminating responses.30  The Court has 
                                                                                                                                         
REV. 2779, 2786 (2009); see also Mark Tushnet, Observations on the New Revolution in 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1627, 1627–28 (2006) (noting that the Warren 
Court’s criminal procedure revolution was driven by concerns about both race and everyday 
policing).  During this revolutionary period, the Justices of the Warren Court were frequently 
substituting their personal philosophies for constitutional principles.  Roth, supra, at 2786–87. 
 26. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.  These rights are so well known today that they are 
essentially “enshrined in our culture.”  Roth, supra note 25, at 2788.  The suspect may, of course, 
voluntarily waive these rights after police have read the Miranda warnings; however, the 
prosecution cannot use any evidence acquired as a result of the interrogation against the suspect 
until such a waiver is proven at trial.  384 U.S. at 479. 
 27. See 384 U.S. at 444. 
 28. See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 7, at 109 (discussing limitations on Miranda, including the 
public safety and impeachment exceptions); WRIGHTSMAN & PITMAN, supra note 7, at 117 
(criticizing some of the limitations on the use of Miranda warnings); Skelton & Connell, supra 
note 2, at 59 (noting that the Court has “chipped away” at the protection conferred by Miranda). 
 29. 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984).  Police officers located Quarles, a rape suspect, in a 
supermarket.  Id. at 651–52.  Upon seeing an officer, Quarles fled toward the back of the store 
where the officer apprehended him.  Id. at 652.  The officer frisked Quarles and discovered he 
was wearing an empty shoulder holster.  Id. at 652.  When the officer asked Quarles where the 
gun was, Quarles replied, “the gun is over there,” and nodded toward a stack of empty cartons.  
Id.  The officer arrested Quarles and read him his Miranda rights.  Id.  After Quarles agreed to 
answer questions without an attorney present, the officer asked him several questions about his 
possession of the gun.  Id.  The Supreme Court concluded that “overriding considerations of 
public safety” justified the officer’s failure to read Quarles the Miranda warnings before asking 
where the gun was located.  Id. at 651.  The Court explained that in situations where public safety 
is threatened, the need to get answers outweighs the need for a rule protecting against  
self-incrimination.  Id. at 657. 
 30. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 300 (1990).  In Perkins, the government placed an 
undercover agent posing as a fellow inmate in Perkins’s jail cell.  Id. at 294.  Although the agent 
was investigating Perkins for murder, Perkins was being held in jail on unrelated charges.  Id.  
During a conversation with the agent, Perkins made incriminating statements about the murder.  
Id. at 294–95.  Obviously, the agent did not read Perkins his Miranda rights before engaging 
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also created an exception allowing the government to introduce some 
statements at trial for the purpose of impeaching a witness, even if the police 
violated Miranda’s requirements in obtaining the statements.31  The Court 
rationalized the creation of these exceptions in each case either by concluding 
that there were no policy reasons offered to justify the warning requirement, or 
that information needs outweighed the right not to incriminate oneself.32  In 
sum, the Miranda requirements apply broadly to custodial interrogations, but 
the Court has gradually carved out certain exceptions to the doctrine for policy 
and administrative reasons.33 
B.  The Routine Booking Exception Develops 
1.  Lower Courts Begin to Recognize the Exception 
During the mid-1970s, courts began to apply a new exception to Miranda’s 
requirements: admission of statements made by suspects during the booking 
process in response to police inquiries seeking biographical information.34  
One principal reason courts created the exception was to facilitate the  
administrative obligations of the police during the booking process.35  Courts 
justified the admission of such statements on the grounds that questioning 
about routine biographical information conducted for administrative purposes 
did not qualify as interrogation.36  The courts have explained that the intent of 
such questions is not to elicit incriminating information; therefore routine 
questions are exempt from the traditional Miranda requirements.37 
                                                                                                                                         
Perkins in conversation.  Id. at 295.  The Supreme Court ruled that the statements made by 
Perkins to the agent while the agent was undercover were admissible and rejected the contention 
that Miranda warnings are required whenever a suspect is technically “in custody” and speaking 
with an agent of the government.  Id. at 297, 300.  The Court further noted that although Miranda 
strictly prevents the use of coercion, it does not forbid “mere strategic deception” gained through 
misplaced trust.  Id. at 297. 
 31. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224–26 (1971).  Harris testified in his own defense 
at his trial for selling heroin.  Id. at 222–23.  On cross-examination, the prosecution asked Harris 
whether his direct testimony at trial contradicted earlier statements that he made to police at the 
time of his arrest.  Id. at 223.  The prosecution conceded that the allegedly contradictory 
statements made at arrest were inadmissible under Miranda, but argued that the statement should 
be permissible as relevant to the witness’s credibility.  Id. at 223–24.  The Supreme Court upheld 
the introduction of the inconsistent statements for the purpose of impeaching Harris’ credibility, 
concluding that Miranda should not be used to prevent the prosecution from impeaching a 
criminal defendant’s perjured testimony.  Id. at 226. 
 32. Skelton & Connell, supra note 2, at 60. 
 33. Id. at 59–60. 
 34. Id. at 60 & n.36. 
 35. Jones v. United States, 779 A.2d 277, 290 (D.C. 2001) (Mack, J., dissenting); Brief in 
Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Alford v. Texas, 358 S.W.3d 647 (Texas Crim. 
App. 2012) (No. 11–1318). 
 36. Skelton & Connell, supra note 2, at 60–61. 
 37. See United States v. La Monica, 472 F.2d 580, 581 (9th Cir. 1972) (explaining that the 
facts showed that the officer’s questions about an item were intended at the time to identify and 
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2.  The Supreme Court First Alludes to the Exception 
The Supreme Court first suggested that an exception to Miranda may exist 
for routine booking questions in the 1980 case, Rhode Island v. Innis.38  
However, the issue presented to the Court in Innis, was how to interpret 
“interrogation” as used by the Miranda Court.39  The Court held that the term 
“refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the 
part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) 
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the suspect.”40  The Court clarified that because police “surely 
cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or 
actions,” the definition of interrogation encompasses only words or actions by 
police officers that the officers “should have known were reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response.”41  The Court also noted that, although the 
intent of the police is not wholly irrelevant, the legal analysis should focus 
primarily on the suspect’s perception of the questions. 42 
                                                                                                                                         
inventory the defendant’s personal effects and were not part of an interrogation); see also Nading 
v. State, 377 N.E.2d 1345, 1348 (Ind. 1978) (“An interrogation occurs only when officials intend 
to elicit, by whatever means, substantive evidence concerning criminal activity.  Routine 
administrative questioning concerning an arrestee’s name and address are usually not considered 
to be part of an ‘interrogation.’”). 
 38. See 446 U.S. 291, 301–02 (1980); Skelton & Connell, supra note 2, at 62–63 
(discussing the timing of the Innis decision, the facts of the case, and the court’s holding). 
 39. 446 U.S. at 298.  In Innis, police arrested a suspect in both a murder and robbery 
investigation, read him his Miranda rights, and placed him in a police car.  Id. at 293–94.  On the 
way to the station, the officers discussed a missing shotgun associated with both crimes the 
arrestee was suspected of committing.  Id. at 294.  During the conversation, one officer expressed 
his concern that a student from a nearby school for handicapped children might find the gun and 
hurt himself.  Id. at 294–95.  Innis interrupted the conversation at this point and agreed to show 
the officers where the shotgun was hidden.  Id. at 295.  After the police reminded Innis of his 
Miranda rights, Innis led the police to the gun.  Id.  Before his trial for kidnapping, robbery, and 
murder, Innis attempted to suppress both the shotgun and his statements to the officers.  Id. at 
295–96.  The judge denied the motion on the grounds that Innis had waived his right to remain 
silent, and the jury convicted Innis on all counts.  Id. at 296.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
reversed the conviction, ruling that the police officers’ discussion amounted to an unlawful 
custodial interrogation under Miranda and that Innis had not waived his right to counsel.  Id.  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to define “interrogation” as used in Miranda.  Id. at 297. 
 40. Id. at 301.  The Court concluded that Innis was not “interrogated” as the term was used 
by the Miranda Court.  Id. at 302.  The Court explained that the police did not expressly question 
Innis, and furthermore that the officers should not “have known that their conversation was 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”  Id.  The Court noted that no evidence was 
offered to suggest that the officers knew that Innis was particularly vulnerable to comments about 
the welfare of handicapped children.  Id. at 302–03.  Similarly, nothing in the record indicated 
that the police knew that Innis was especially disoriented or distressed when they arrested him.  
Id. 
 41. Id. at 302.  Several courts have relied on this language to define the scope of the routine 
booking exception.  See infra Part I.C.1. 
 42. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 & n.7.  For example, the Court noted that “[a]ny knowledge the 
police may have had concerning the unusual susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of 
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In 1983, the Court shed light on the types of police questioning that qualify 
as “normally attendant to arrest and custody” under Innis.43  In South Dakota v. 
Neville, the police arrested a suspect for driving under the influence after he 
failed a variety of field sobriety tests.44  The suspect then refused to submit to a 
blood-alcohol test.45  The trial court granted his motion to suppress all 
evidence of his refusal based on his Fifth Amendment privilege against  
self-incrimination.46  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a suspect’s 
refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, after a lawful request by an officer to 
submit to the test, does not constitute a coerced act, and is therefore not 
protected by the Fifth Amendment.47  The Court explained that such an inquiry 
instead qualifies as police words or actions “normally attendant to arrest and 
custody,” as described by the Court in Innis.48  The Court equated the blood-
alcohol test request to a police request to submit to fingerprinting, noting that 
such a request “is highly regulated by state law, and is presented in virtually 
the same words to all suspects.”49  Therefore, such an inquiry is not an 
“interrogation” for purposes of Miranda.50 
3.  The Supreme Court Recognizes the Existence of the Exception, but Fails 
to Define its Scope 
In 1990, a four-justice plurality directly addressed the routine booking 
exception in Pennsylvania v. Muniz.51  However, the plurality failed to go so 
                                                                                                                                         
persuasion might be an important factor in determining whether the police should have known 
that their words and actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 
suspect.”  Id. at 301 n.8. 
 43. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 n.15 (1983) (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 
301). 
 44. Id. at 555. 
 45. Id. at 556. 
 46. Id.  Under South Dakota law, “refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test ‘may be 
admissible into evidence at the trial.’”  Id. (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32–23–10.1 (2011)).  
The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s suppression of evidence, holding that 
§ 32–23–10.1 violated the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination.  Id. 
 47. Id. at 564. 
 48. Id. at 564 n.15 (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601–02 (1990) (plurality opinion).  Police pulled 
Muniz over on the suspicion that he was driving under the influence.  Id. at 585.  The officer 
asked Muniz to complete three routine field sobriety tests, each of which he performed poorly.  
Id.  Police arrested Muniz after he admitted to the officer that he had been drinking.  Id.  At the 
station and before reading Muniz his Miranda rights, an officer asked Muniz his name, address, 
height, weight, eye color, date of birth, current age, and the date of his sixth birthday.  Id. at 586.  
The police department videotaped the entire exchange pursuant to the station’s routine practices.  
Id. at 585.  Muniz had difficulty stating his address and age and was unable to remember the date 
of his sixth birthday.  Id. at 586.  After the jury convicted Muniz of driving under the influence, 
Muniz moved for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting his video testimony 
into evidence on the grounds that it violated his Miranda rights.  Id. at 587.  The trial court denied 
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far as to define the scope of the exception or to announce a clear rule for 
determining when the exception applies.52  Justice Brennan, writing for the 
plurality, merely stated that the routine booking exception “exempts from 
Miranda’s coverage questions to secure the ‘biographical data necessary to 
complete booking or pretrial services.’”53  Justice Brennan explained that 
Miranda does not protect inquiries that “appear reasonably related to the 
police’s administrative concerns.”54  In a footnote near the end of the opinion, 
the plurality noted that “‘[w]ithout obtaining a waiver of the suspect’s Miranda 
rights, the police may not ask questions, even during booking, that are 
designed to elicit incriminatory admissions.’”55  The plurality ruled that 
Muniz’s answers to certain biographical questions such as age and address 
were properly admitted at trial, even in the absence of a Miranda warning, 
because the questioning fell within the routine booking exception.56 
                                                                                                                                         
the motion, but the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that the trial court should 
have suppressed the entire audio portion of the tape.  Id. at 587–88. 
 52. See Skelton & Connell, supra note 2, at 65. 
 53. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 12, Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (No. 89–213)). 
 54. Id. at 601–02. 
 55. Id. at 602 n.14 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
supra note 53, at 13).  As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently explained, “[t]he 
meaning of this footnote and how courts are to apply it has been the subject of debate among 
courts throughout the country.”  Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), 
cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 122 (2012).  Several courts have relied on the footnote’s “designed to 
elicit” language in defining the scope of the routine booking exception.  See infra Part I.C.2. 
 56. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601–02.  Specifically, the Court explained that Muniz’s answers to 
the officer’s inquiries as to his name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current 
age should not have been suppressed; they were admissible under the routine booking exception.  
Id. at 601.  However, the Court determined that the sixth birthday was testimonial in nature and 
thus, inadmissible.  Id. at 600.  Therefore, the Court vacated the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s 
judgment reversing Muniz’s conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings.  Id. at 
605–06.  Justice Brennan explicitly stated that the parties had not asked the Court to decide 
whether the error was harmless, but he noted that the state court could take up the issue on 
remand.  Id. at 605 n.22.  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens 
filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, and dissenting in part.  Id. at 
606 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part).  
The Justices agreed that Muniz’s answers to the seven biographical questions should not have 
been suppressed, but in their view, the questions were not testimonial and therefore did not fall 
within the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination.  Id. at 608.  As such, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist stated that it was unnecessary to evaluate whether a routine booking exception to 
Miranda applied.  Id.  The concurring and dissenting Justices also posited that the sixth birthday 
question was similarly non-testimonial and should not have been suppressed.  Id. at 606–08.  
Justice Marshall agreed with the plurality that the trial court should have suppressed the sixth 
birthday question but he strongly objected to the plurality’s recognition of a routine booking 
exception to Miranda.  Id. at 608 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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4.  Courts and Commentators Recognize the Possibility of Abuse of the 
Exception 
Soon after the emergence of the routine booking exception, courts 
recognized the opportunity the exception provides for abuse by law 
enforcement.57  As early as the mid-1970s, the Second Circuit noted that an 
exception for routine booking questions could allow for abuse by police who 
seek to elicit incriminating information under the guise of a booking 
question.58  Thus, courts and commentators alike have suggested imposing 
various procedural restrictions on the routine booking exception to prevent it 
from being extended beyond constitutional limits.59  The two primary 
proposals are: (1) requiring that qualifying questions be asked at the police 
station during the actual booking process,60 and (2) limiting the qualifying 
questions to those seeking identification or biographical information.61 
C.  A Circuit Split Emerges 
The Court has not squarely addressed the routine booking exception since 
the vague plurality opinion in Muniz.62  Courts across the country have 
“universally accepted” the existence of a routine booking exception to 
Miranda,63 but they remain “deeply divided” over the exception’s scope.64  As 
a result, a circuit split has developed as courts attempt to define the scope of 
the exception in light of the Supreme Court’s limited pronouncements in Innis, 
Neville, and Muniz.65  Three tests for defining the exception’s scope have 
                                                            
 57. See Skelton & Connell, supra note 2, at 61–62 (“Even courts that recognized a booking 
exception to Miranda acknowledged that the intent of the police could interfere with the 
constitutional protections that the Court in Miranda intended to provide.”). 
 58. United States ex rel. Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1113 n.2 (2d Cir. 1975); see 
also United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[W]e recognize the potential 
for abuse by law enforcement officers who might, under the guise of seeking ‘objective’ or 
‘neutral’ information, deliberately elicit an incriminating statement from a suspect.”). 
 59. See Skelton & Connell, supra note 2, at 57. 
 60. See id. at 95–96; see also United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 425 (6th Cir. 
2008) (“Extending the exception to the type of questioning here–which occurred in a private 
home during the investigatory stage of criminal proceedings–would undermine the protections 
that Miranda seeks to afford to criminal suspects.”). 
 61. See Skelton & Connell, supra note 2, at 97–98; see Hughes v. State, 695 A.2d 132, 139 
(Md. 1997) (quoting LaVallee, 521 F.2d at 1113 & n. 2.) (stating that questions qualifying under 
the routine booking exception “must be directed toward securing ‘simple identification 
information of the most basic sort’”). 
 62. On October 1, 2012, the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in 
Alford v. Texas, the latest case to address the routine booking exception.  133 S.Ct. 122 (2012); 
see also Alford v. Texas, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/alford-v 
-texas/ (last visited July 19, 2013). 
 63. See Presely v. City of Benbrook, 4 F.3d 405, 408 n.2 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 64. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 9. 
 65. See Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 658–59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), cert. denied, 133 
S.Ct. 122  (2012); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 9–10 (explaining that courts 
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developed in the courts: a should-have-known test, an intent test, and a 
legitimate administrative function test.66 
1.  The Should-Have-Known Test 
In attempting to define the scope of the routine booking exception, several 
federal courts of appeals have applied an objective should-have-known 
standard.67  Relying on language the Supreme Court used in Innis,68 the First, 
Second, and Eighth Circuits have concluded that a Miranda warning is 
required when an officer should have known or expected that a booking 
question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.69  The Sixth 
and Ninth Circuits have simplified the inquiry slightly, asking only “whether 
the question is ‘reasonably likely to elicit incriminating’” responses.70  Several 
state high courts have also adopted some variation of the should-have-known 
standard.71  Regardless of the precise language used to frame the inquiry, 
courts adopting this objective test “simply [read] out any distinction between 
                                                                                                                                         
have taken divergent approaches in determining when the routine booking exception applies); 
Olsen, supra note 15 (noting that the petition for certiorari filed in the Alford case indicates a 
circuit split). 
 66. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 9–10. 
 67. See Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 658; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 10. 
 68. See supra text accompanying notes 38–42 (outlining the relevant facts and legal 
reasoning involved in Innis). 
 69. See United States v. Rodriguez, 356 F.3d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that a 
Miranda warning was not required when there was nothing to indicate that the questioning agent 
should have known that incriminating evidence would be elicited from his administrative 
interview of the suspect); see also United States v. Reyes, 225 F.3d 71, 76–77 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(explaining that “the inquiry into whether the booking exception is thus inapplicable is actually an 
objective one: whether the questions and circumstances were such that the officer should 
reasonably have expected the question to elicit an incriminating response”).  Similarly, the Eighth 
Circuit has reaffirmed that questions will only be scrutinized when the government agent should 
reasonably have known that his or her questions, even though typically administrative in nature, 
would elicit information “‘directly relevant to the substantive offense charged.’”  United States v. 
Brown, 101 F.3d 1272, 1274 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. McLaughlin, 777 F.2d 388, 
392 (8th Cir. 1985)). 
 70. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 11 (quoting United States v.  
Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1280 (1983)); see also United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 
420, 423–24 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)) 
(explaining that a Miranda warning was required when police asked Lopez “where he was from, 
how he had arrived at the house, and when he had arrived” because these questions are 
“‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response’”); Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d at 1280 
(stating that “[i]n this case, the questioning conducted by Investigator DeWitt was reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response from Mata” and therefore constitutes an interrogation). 
 71. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 10–11 (citing numerous cases in which 
state courts applied the should-have-known standard).  For example, in State v. Rossignol, the 
Supreme Court of Maine explained that the routine booking exception applies to questions that 
are administrative in nature and “not likely to elicit an incriminating response.”  627 A.2d 524, 
526 (Me. 1993). 
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the Muniz-footnote ‘design’ language and the Innis test, applying the latter to 
all custodial inquiries regardless of their potential administrative function.”72 
For example, the Ninth Circuit applied the should-have-known test in United 
States v. Mata-Abundiz.73  Police arrested Mata-Abundiz and charged him with 
possession of a firearm by an illegal alien.74  A criminal investigator from the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service visited Mata-Abundiz in jail and, 
without advising him of his Miranda rights, asked him questions about his 
immigration status, including his citizenship.75  Mata’s response that he was a 
citizen of Mexico was offered as the only evidence of his alienage at trial.76  
His alienage was a fundamental element of the crime that the government 
needed to prove in order to secure his conviction.77  On appeal, the government 
attempted to justify the admission of the statement on the grounds that the 
questioning qualified under the routine booking exception.78  The Ninth Circuit 
stated that the relevant inquiry to determine whether the exception applies is 
whether, under all of the circumstances, “the questions are reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response” from the suspect.79 
The court concluded that the investigator’s inquiry was “highly likely to 
elicit incriminating information,” especially because it was directly related to 
an element of the crime that the police had charged Mata-Abundiz with.80  The 
court determined that the police should have known the question would elicit 
an incriminating response from Mata-Abundiz.81  Thus, the court held that the 
question was inadmissible in the absence of a Miranda warning and 
accordingly reversed Mata’s conviction.82 
                                                            
 72. Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 658 (comparing the appellant’s reasoning to differing judicial 
approaches). 
 73. 717 F.2d at 1280 (describing the investigator’s questioning as “reasonably likely to elicit 
an incriminating response”). 
 74. Id. at 1278. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  The court admitted the statement over Mata’s objection.  Id. 
 77. Id. (noting that the only federal charge alleged against Mata was for possession of a 
firearm by an illegal alien). 
 78. Id. at 1280. 
 79. Id. (citing United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1237–38 (9th. Cir. 1981)).  The  
Mata-Abundiz court noted that, although the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer is 
relevant to the inquiry, it is not dispositive.  Id.  Moreover, the court also explained that the 
relationship the questions posed bear to the crime the defendant was suspected of is “highly 
relevant.”  Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (concluding that “in-custody questioning by INS investigators must be preceded by 
Miranda warnings, if the questioning is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response”). 
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2.  The Intent Test 
The Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, as well as some state high 
courts, have taken a different approach and adopted a subjective intent test.83  
The intent test requires police to give a Miranda warning only if the officer 
intends his inquiry to elicit incriminating information.84  Courts applying the 
intent test generally rely on the language in footnote fourteen of the Muniz 
plurality opinion.85  These courts interpret the plurality’s “designed to elicit” 
language as meaning that the court should apply the routine booking exception 
to administrative questions unless the officer subjectively intends to elicit 
incriminating responses from the suspect.86 
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied 
the intent test in United States v. Virgen-Moreno.87  In Virgen-Moreno, the 
police arrested Anguiano and others for conspiracy to distribute 
methamphetamine.88  Drug Enforcement Agency agents questioned Anguiano 
prior to reading him his Miranda rights, allegedly for the purpose of collecting 
information to complete a personal background form.89  At trial, the 
government admitted portions of the interview into evidence in order to link 
Anguiano to the alleged conspiracy.90  On appeal, the government contended 
that the transcript of the interview was admissible because the questions the 
                                                            
 83. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 12–13.  For example, the Supreme Court 
of Kentucky applied the intent test in Dixon v. Commonwealth, concluding that the question at 
issue fell within the routine booking exception because the detective did not “deliberately elicit 
[] incriminating information under the guise of asking a routine booking question.”  149 S.W.3d 
426, 433 (Ky. 2004).  In State v. Chrisicos, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire also applied 
the intent test, holding that the inquiry at issue did not fall within the routine booking exception 
because it was designed to elicit an incriminating answer from the defendant.  See 813 A.2d 513, 
516 (N.H. 2002). 
 84. See Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 659 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), cert. denied, 133 
S.Ct. 122  (2012) (explaining that an officer must have “an interrogative intent” for administrative 
questioning to fall outside the routine booking exception); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra 
note 2, at 12. 
 85. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 13 (arguing that most courts that adopt 
the intent test rely on the Muniz decision); see, e.g., Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 659.  Footnote fourteen 
states that, “‘[T]he police may not ask questions, even during booking, that are designed to elicit 
incriminatory admissions.’”  Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 602 n.14 (1990) (plurality 
opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, supra note 53, at 13). 
 86. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 13; see Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 659 (noting 
that many courts narrowly interpret the language in Muniz “as precluding only questions that 
were, in fact, intended to elicit incriminating information”). 
 87. See 265 F.3d 276, 294 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the agents’ questions were designed 
or intended to elicit incriminating responses). 
 88. Id. at 283. 
 89. Id. at 293.  The agents questioned Anguiano repeatedly about the address on his driver’s 
license, as well as the nature of his association with an address the agents suspected was linked to 
the conspiracy.  Id. at 294. 
 90. Id. at 293. 
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officers posed to Anguiano fell within the routine booking exception to 
Miranda.91 
The Fifth Circuit, citing Muniz, noted that, “questions designed to elicit 
incriminatory admissions are not covered under the routine booking question 
exception.”92  The court concluded that the inquiries at issue were meant to, 
and in fact did, elicit incriminatory information.93  Thus, because the officer 
subjectively intended to elicit incriminating statements, the routine booking 
exception did not apply and the statements were inadmissible.94  The Fourth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have also applied (or explicitly expressed support 
for) the intent test.95 
3.  The Legitimate Administrative Function Test 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 
United States v. Gaston created a third test to determine the scope of the 
routine booking exception: the legitimate administrative function test.96  Under 
this approach, a Miranda warning is not required for a statement to be 
admissible at trial if, from an objective standpoint, the inquiry is reasonably 
related to a legitimate administrative function or concern.97 
                                                            
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 293–94 (citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 602 n.14 (1990) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 93. Id. at 294.  Although the Fifth Circuit held that the trial court improperly admitted 
Anguiano’s statements, it concluded that the error was harmless because the other evidence 
linking Anguiano to the conspiracy was “overwhelming.”  Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See, e.g, United States v. D’Anjou, 16 F.3d 604, 608 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that the 
routine booking exception “does not apply to questions, even during booking, that are designed to 
elicit incriminatory admissions”) (citing Muniz, 496 U.S. at 602 n.14); United States v. Parra, 2 
F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the government agent questioned the defendant 
for “the direct and admitted purpose of linking [him] to his incriminating immigration file” and 
thus, the questioning qualified as an interrogation); see also United States v. Sweeting, 933 F.2d 
962, 965 (11th Cir. 1991) (accepting the defendant’s argument that questions intended to elicit 
incriminating information are inadmissible absent a Miranda warning, but noting that the record 
contained no evidence of such an intent). 
 96. See United States v. Gaston, 357 F.3d 77, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 14 (noting that the Gaston court followed the legitimate 
administrative function test to determine whether a question fell within the routine booking 
exception).  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has also adopted the legitimate administrative 
function test.  Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 659–60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), cert. denied, 133 
S.Ct. 122  (2012). 
 97. See Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 659–60; Gaston, 357 F.3d at 82 (quoting Muniz, 496 U.S. at 
601–02) (referencing language from Muniz in support of its determination that questions about 
the defendant’s address and ownership interest in a house were related to record-keeping concerns 
and therefore did not require a Miranda warning). 
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In Gaston, the defendant made the statements at issue while police executed 
a search warrant for a firearm at his home.98  Officers handcuffed Gaston and 
asked him several biographical questions without advising him of his Miranda 
rights, including where he resided.99  After Gaston responded that he lived at 
the address where the police were conducting the search, the officer asked if he 
owned the house.100  The government later introduced Gaston’s responses at 
his trial as evidence that he owned the firearm the police found during their 
search.101  The D.C. Circuit ruled that the trial court did not err in refusing to 
suppress the statements because the questioning was permissible under the 
routine booking exception as part of the police’s legitimate administrative 
function.102 
In adopting the legitimate administrative function test, the court relied on the 
plurality’s language in Muniz and stated that “officers asking routine booking 
questions ‘reasonably related to the police’s administrative concerns’ are not 
engaged in interrogation within Miranda’s meaning.”103  The Court reasoned 
that because standard booking inquiries do not constitute a custodial 
interrogation, the suspect’s answers are admissible even absent a Miranda 
warning.104  The D.C. Circuit therefore interpreted the Innis and Muniz cases 
together to create a routine booking exception that is independent of the 
should-have-known test used by other circuits.105  Even though the questions 
asked in Gaston were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response 
under Innis because Gaston’s address was a critical link in his ownership or 
                                                            
 98. Gaston, 357 F.3d at 79–80.  The magistrate issued the search warrant based on 
information obtained from a confidential informant.  Id. at 79.  The informant gave the agent 
“Jimmy’s” address and reported seeing a handgun there recently.  Id.  The agent concluded that 
“Jimmy” was James Gaston, who had been previously convicted of multiple firearm violations.  
Id. at 79–80. 
 99. Id. at 81.  The officers also asked Gaston for his name, social security number, and date 
of birth.  Id. 
 100. Id.  Gaston explained that he co-owned the home with his sisters.  Id. 
 101. Id.  A jury ultimately convicted Gaston of possession of heroin with intent to distribute, 
possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, and unlawful possession of a firearm by 
a felon, all of which he appealed.  Id. at 79. 
 102. Id. at 82.  The court explained that the officer’s inquiries “dealt as much with  
record-keeping as the similar booking questions asked in Muniz” because pursuant to the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, “the ‘officer executing the warrant must . . . give a copy of the 
warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, 
the property was taken.”  Id. (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(3)(A) (renumbered as FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 41(f)(1)(C))).  Therefore, the court held that the inquiry regarding homeownership was 
reasonably related to a legitimate administrative function and thus, fell within the exception to 
Miranda.  See id. 
 103. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601–02 (1990) (plurality opinion)). 
 104. Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 14 (explaining that officers need not 
give Miranda warnings when a suspect is not in custody). 
 105. Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 658 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 
122  (2012). 
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possession of the firearm, the court held that the questions’ legitimate 
administrative function exempted them from Miranda’s requirements.106 
Most recently, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered the scope of 
the routine booking exception in Alford v. State.107  After conducting “one of 
the most thoughtful examinations of the booking exception in many years,”108 
the court elected to adopt the legitimate administrative function test.109  The 
Alford court concluded that the legitimate administrative function test provided 
“a more logical interpretation of the [routine booking] exception” than other 
tests.110  The court also noted that the test both encourages administrative 
efficiency and helps to ensure the safety of police station personnel, other 
inmates, and the suspect himself.111 
II.  EVALUATING THE THREE TESTS IN TERMS OF CONSISTENCY WITH 
PRECEDENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY 
A.  Analyzing Whether the Three Tests Are Consistent with Precedent 
1.  Of the Three Tests, the Legitimate Administrative Function Test is the 
Most Consistent with Supreme Court Precedent 
Although the Supreme Court has addressed the routine booking exception in 
several opinions, the Court has provided very little guidance on the exception’s 
scope.112  The legitimate administrative function test is most consistent with 
                                                            
 106. Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 658–59 (noting that, although questions of an administrative 
nature may elicit incriminating responses, that alone does not require a Miranda warning). 
 107. Id. at 658–60.  The police took Alford into custody for evading arrest.  Id. at 650.  After 
Alford exited the patrol car, an officer recovered a plastic bag of pills and a computer flash drive 
from under the back seat where Alford had been sitting.  Id.  While searching Alford during 
booking, the officer asked him if he owned the flash drive found in the car.  Id. at 650–51.  After 
Alford confirmed that the flash drive was his, the officer catalogued it along with the rest of 
Alford’s personal property.  Id. at 651.  At the time of this questioning, Alford had not yet been 
read his Miranda rights.  Id.  After the lab determined that the pills were ecstasy, a grand jury 
indicted Alford on an additional charge, possession of a controlled substance.  Id.  Prior to trial, 
Alford filed a motion to suppress his responses to the officer’s questions about the flash drive.  Id.  
The court denied the motion and admitted Alford’s statements to the officer at trial as evidence of 
Alford’s knowledge and possession of the ecstasy.  Id. at 651–52.  A jury convicted Alford and 
sentenced him to five years in prison.  Id. at 652.  Both the court of appeals and the Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals (the state’s highest court for appeals from criminal cases) affirmed Alford’s 
conviction.  Id. at 652, 662.  On October 1, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Alford’s 
petition for a writ of certiorari.  Alford v. Texas, supra note 62. 
 108. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 35, at 10. 
 109. Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 659–61. 
 110. See id. at 661.  The court rejected Alford’s proposed adoption of the should-have-known 
test, explaining that the test “renders the exception a nullity” and disregards the language used by 
the Supreme Court in Innis.  Id. at 660. 
 111. Id. at 661. 
 112. See Skelton & Connell, supra note 2, at 56. 
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the Supreme Court’s limited pronouncements about the exception in Innis and 
Muniz.113 
In Innis, the Court effectively created the routine booking exception by 
“exclud[ing] from the definition of custodial interrogation questions that are 
‘normally attendant to arrest and custody.’”114  According to the legitimate 
administrative function test, police inquiries qualify under the routine booking 
exception if they are “reasonably relate[d] to a legitimate administrative 
concern.”115  The legitimate administrative function test is consistent with Innis 
because a determination of whether a certain question is normally attendant to 
arrest and custody essentially requires asking whether the question at issue is 
reasonably related to one of the various administrative tasks that police must 
complete during the booking process.116  Booking questions that are reasonably 
related to a legitimate administrative function are thus, by definition, normally 
attendant to arrest and custody.117  Therefore, these questions do not constitute 
custodial interrogation under Innis, even if “police should know that such 
questions are reasonably likely to elicit incriminating information.”118 
The legitimate administrative function test is also consistent with the holding 
of Muniz.119  In Muniz, a plurality of the Court concluded that “questions 
appear[ing] reasonably related to the police’s administrative concerns . . . fall 
outside the protections of Miranda.”120  On that basis, the Court ruled that the 
trial court’s admission of the suspect’s responses to seven standard, 
biographical questions was proper, even absent a Miranda warning.121  
However, the court also ruled that the admission of the suspect’s response to 
an inquiry regarding the date of his sixth birthday was improper.122  
Application of the legitimate administrative function test demonstrates why the 
first seven questions were permissible, whereas the birth date question was 
not.123  Although the Muniz Court did not purport to apply a particular test in 
                                                            
 113. See infra notes 114–24 and accompanying text. 
 114. Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 660 (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. (noting that “routine administrative questions necessary for booking processing 
do not constitute interrogation, regardless of whether police should know that such questions are 
reasonably likely to elicit incriminating information”). 
 117. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. 
 118. See Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 660. 
 119. See infra notes 120–24 and accompanying text. 
 120. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601–02 (1990) (plurality opinion). 
 121. See id. at 600–01. 
 122. Id. at 598–600 (characterizing defendant Muniz’s response as testimonial, thus requiring 
a Miranda warning). 
 123. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 35, at 17–18 (quoting 
Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601–02) (noting that the seven biographical questions posed to the suspect 
“were approved because of the nature of the questions,” and that “[t]he ‘sixth birthday’ question 
was disapproved because the date of Mr. Muniz’s sixth birthday was not a legitimate 
administrative concern of the jail”). 
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determining which questions were admissible, the application of the legitimate 
administrative function test is consistent with the plurality’s ultimate 
conclusion.124 
2.  The Should-Have-Known and Intent Tests are Inconsistent with 
Precedent 
By contrast, the should-have-known and intent tests are inconsistent with the 
Court’s precedent regarding the routine booking exception.125  First, as the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently argued, the should-have-known test 
“renders the [routine booking] exception a nullity” by “subject[ing] all 
custodial questions, ‘booking’ or otherwise, to the should-have-known test.”126  
The same court asked, “[w]hat would be the purpose of asking whether a 
question is a ‘booking question’ if, regardless of the answer, admissibility of 
the response ultimately turns on whether the question was reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response?”127  Therefore, arguably, application of the 
should-have-known test reduces the Innis Court’s “normally attendant to arrest 
and custody” language to “meaningless surplusage.”128 
Additionally, the intent test is founded almost entirely on dicta in Muniz; 
specifically, the test is based on a footnote that approvingly quotes an amicus 
brief.129  Furthermore, application of the intent test is inconsistent with Innis, 
where the Court explicitly stated that the intent of the officer posing the 
question, while potentially relevant, is not dispositive.130  Therefore, it seems 
highly unlikely that the Court intended the scope of the routine booking 
exception to turn solely on whether the officer intended to elicit incriminating 
information from the suspect.131  Furthermore, in several criminal procedure 
contexts, the Court has expressed an aversion to using subjective standards to 
determine the intent of the police officer.132 
                                                            
 124. See id. at 27–29. 
 125. See infra notes 126–32 and accompanying text. 
 126. Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 
122  (2012); see also Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 35, at 22 
(“[The should-have-known test] would make the entire booking exception doctrine a meaningless 
nullity . . . [it] is the same test that would apply even had the booking doctrine never been 
adopted.”). 
 127. Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 660. 
 128. See Velazquez v. Lape, 622 F. Supp. 2d 23, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Rhode Island v. 
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). 
 129. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 35, at 26 (citing 
Muniz, 496 U.S. at 602 n.14); supra text accompanying notes 85–86. 
 130. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 n.7 (clarifying that police intent may play a role in 
determining whether the police should have known that a question is reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response). 
 131. See id. 
 132. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 625–26 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
Justice O’Connor explained that focusing on an officer’s subjective intent is “an unattractive 
proposition that we all but uniformly avoid.”  Id.  Courts disfavor inquiries into an officer’s intent 
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In sum, the legitimate administrative function test is most consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s limited precedent on the routine booking exception.  In 
determining which of the three tests to adopt, another factor to consider is the 
extent to which each test encourages administrative efficiency. 
B.  Assessing the Degree of Administrative Efficiency Promoted by Each Test 
1.  The Legitimate Administrative Function Test Encourages Efficiency Both 
at the Police Station and in Court 
The legitimate administrative function test is not only consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent;133 it also improves administrative efficiency by 
providing law enforcement with a straightforward standard to apply to the 
questions posed at the station during booking.134  As the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals recently explained in Alford v. State, the test “afford[s]  
law-enforcement personnel a sphere in which to quickly and consistently 
administer booking procedures without having to analyze each question to 
determine if it is likely to elicit an incriminating response.”135  The efficiency 
and certainty provided by the legitimate administrative function test renders it 
particularly valuable in light of the Supreme Court’s repeated expression of a 
preference for providing law enforcement personnel with clear and  
easy-to-apply tests and standards.136 
The legitimate administrative function test further promotes administrative 
efficiency by providing a clear standard for courts to apply to the routine 
                                                                                                                                         
largely because of the difficulty of proving subjective motivations.  See, e.g., New York v. 
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984) (explaining that the application of the public safety exception 
to Miranda does not depend on the subjective motives of the officer involved because, among 
other reasons, these motives will be “largely unverifiable”); infra text accompanying notes  
142–45.  The Court has similarly eschewed subjective standards in the Fourth Amendment 
context.  See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play 
no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”). 
 133. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 134. See Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), cert. denied, 133 
S.Ct. 122  (2012) (noting that the exemption allows for streamlined booking procedures without 
having to analyze each question for Miranda purposes). 
 135. Id. 
 136. The Supreme Court has often emphasized the importance of providing police with clear 
standards in the context of both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  For example, the Court has 
praised the Miranda doctrine for “informing police and prosecutors with specificity as to what 
they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and [for] informing courts under what 
circumstances statements obtained during such interrogation are not admissible.”  Fare v. Michael 
C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979); see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986) (noting the 
“ease and clarity” with which the Miranda rule can be applied); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 
420, 430 (1984) (explaining that one of the primary advantages of the Miranda doctrine is the 
clarity that it provides).  In the context of the Fourth Amendment, the Court has similarly 
explained that “[a] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only 
limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in 
the specific circumstances they confront.”  Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979). 
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booking exception.137  The test thus provides officers with an unambiguous 
standard to quickly apply at the scene, and also allows a court to easily and 
objectively verify the officer’s application of the test.138 
2.  The Should-Have-Known and Intent Tests Do Not Improve 
Administrative Efficiency 
By contrast, the should-have-known test and the intent test do not 
necessarily improve administrative efficiency.139  The objective  
should-have-known test is most practical for an ex post judicial determination 
as to the propriety of the questioning in a given situation.  However, the test 
does not provide law enforcement officers with a quick and clear way to 
determine at the station whether the question they wish to ask is permissible 
absent a Miranda warning.140  The should-have-known test would instead “put 
the police through [the] gauntlet” by requiring them to perform a fact-specific 
evaluation of each booking question to determine if the question is likely to 
elicit incriminating information.141 
Alternatively, the intent test, as a subjective standard, could prove difficult 
for courts to apply in practice.142  Commentators have observed that subjective 
standards are generally “difficult to abide by [and] hard to administer.”143  
Specifically, courts often disfavor subjective standards because “[j]udicial 
investigation of police purpose is a frustrating, ordinarily futile endeavor.”144  
Adopting a subjective intent-based test could therefore clog already 
overburdened dockets instead of clarifying and streamlining the application of 
the routine booking exception.145 
                                                            
 137. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 35, at 24–25 
(arguing that, absent an exemption, police would have to analyze every booking question for 
compliance with Miranda). 
 138. See supra text accompanying notes 134–37. 
 139. See infra text accompanying 140–45. 
 140. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 35, at 24–25. 
 141. Id. at 25.  The should-have-known test would thus “present[] police with an 
extraordinary challenge” by requiring them “to filter millions of routine booking questions 
looking for a question that is ‘directly relevant’ or that goes to an ‘essential element.’”  Id. at 24. 
 142. See infra notes 143–45 and accompanying text. 
 143. George E. Dix, Subjective “Intent” as a Component of Fourth Amendment 
Reasonableness, 76 MISS. L.J. 373, 385 (2006). 
 144. Id.; see also supra note 132 and accompanying text.  In the context of the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule, Justice White similarly and famously wrote “sending state and 
federal courts on an expedition into the minds of police officers would produce a grave and 
fruitless misallocation of judicial resources.”  Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) 
(White, J., dissenting). 
 145. For example, problems would arise if different police officers involved in a single 
interrogation indicated they possessed different states of mind regarding whether the inquiry was 
intended or designed to elicit incriminating information.  See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 
626 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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III.  THE LEGITIMATE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION TEST SHOULD BE ADOPTED, 
BUT PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS REMAIN NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE 
ACCUSED 
In its original form, the routine booking exception was narrow and 
straightforward.146  Unfortunately, the vague language used in Innis and Muniz 
has resulted in confusing and conflicting subsequent decisions on the scope of 
the exception.147  Under the legitimate administrative function test, the only 
analysis required is whether, from an objective standpoint, the booking inquiry 
is reasonably related to a legitimate administrative function or concern.148  The 
legitimate administrative function test should be adopted as it is most 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent,149 best promotes administrative 
efficiency,150 and will return the booking exception to its foundation as a 
simple, limited exception to Miranda intended only to facilitate police’s 
administrative duties during booking.151 
Since the exception’s initial development, courts have recognized the 
possibility of its abuse by law enforcement.152  To minimize the risk of such 
abuse, courts and commentators alike have suggested imposing certain 
procedural limitations on the routine booking exception.153  Although the 
adoption of the legitimate administrative function test will improve 
administrative efficiency,154 it is unlikely to reduce the potential for abuse of 
                                                            
 146. One judge has observed that the routine booking exception’s background “reveals that it 
was a limited exception created to facilitate the administrative duties of the police at the station 
house.”  Jones v. United States, 779 A.2d 277, 290 (D.C. 2001) (Mack, J., dissenting). 
 147. See Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), cert. denied, 133 
S.Ct. 122  (2012); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 9 (“Courts have adopted varying 
and inconsistent tests to determine whether a particular question falls within the routine booking 
exception.”); Skelton & Connell, supra note 2, at 74 (noting the existence of “confusion in the 
lower courts” over when the exception applies). 
 148. See Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 659–60; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 14. 
 149. See supra Part II.A. 
 150. See supra Part II.B. 
 151. See supra Part I.B. 
 152. See supra Part I.B.4. 
 153. For example, Megan Skelton and James Connell have suggested that courts should 
restrict qualifying inquiries to those the police ask at the station during the actual booking process 
and those seeking identification or biographical information.  Skelton & Connell, supra note 2, at 
95–96.  Similarly, judges have argued that questions qualifying under the routine booking 
exception “must be directed toward securing ‘simple identification information of the most basic 
sort.’”  Hughes v. State, 695 A.2d 132, 139 (Md. 1997) (quoting United States ex rel. Hines v. 
LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1113 n.2. (2d Cir. 1975)).  Some judges have alternatively expressed 
support for the notion that the routine booking exception should only apply to questions seeking 
information the police need to complete booking paperwork or to comply with other mandatory 
booking procedures.  See, e.g., United States v. Guess, 756 F. Supp. 2d 730, 741 (E.D. Va. 2010), 
cert. denied, 184 L. Ed. 2d 667 (2013). 
 154. See supra Part II.B. 
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the exception.155  Therefore, additional safeguards are necessary to protect the 
rights of the accused.  The routine booking exception should be interpreted to 
require that questions falling within the exception must not only be reasonably 
related to a legitimate administrative function, but also must be asked at the 
station during the actual booking process,156 and must seek to elicit only the 
information (whether strictly biographical in nature or not) necessary for police 
to complete any booking paperwork.157 
A.  The Inquiry Must be Posed at the Station During Booking 
The routine booking exception should require law enforcement to pose 
questions to the suspect at the police station during the actual booking 
process.158  Although such a requirement may seem obvious or trivial, courts 
often admit suspects’ answers to booking-type questions posed outside of the 
station into evidence.159  For example, the D.C. Circuit in United States v. 
Gaston declined to suppress a suspect’s response to an officer’s inquiry posed 
in the suspect’s home, while the suspect was handcuffed.160  Applying the 
legitimate administrative function test, the court concluded that the questioning 
satisfied the routine booking exception and that the trial court properly 
admitted the suspect’s statements into evidence.161  Gaston offers a clear 
example of the potential for continuing abuse of the exception even after 
adoption of the legitimate administrative test, and thus the need for additional 
procedural safeguards. 
Restricting the routine booking exception to inquiries posed at the station 
during the booking process gives courts “a fundamentally clear-cut way” to 
determine whether an alleged routine booking question was in fact proper.162  
The “bright line” established by such a limitation will serve to “[shed] light on 
whether the police were acting with an investigatory purpose,” or merely 
fulfilling their administrative duties.163 
B.  The Inquiry Must Seek Only the Information Necessary to Complete 
Booking Paperwork 
Additionally, courts and commentators have suggested limiting qualifying 
inquiries to those seeking “basic identification information” such as name, date 
                                                            
 155. See infra text accompanying notes 159–61. 
 156. See infra Part III.A. 
 157. See infra Part III.B. 
 158. Skelton & Connell, supra note 2, at 95. 
 159. Id. at 95–96 (citing State v. Smith, 785 So. 2d 815, 817–18 (La. 2001); United States v. 
Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 385 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
 160. 357 F.3d 77, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see supra text accompanying notes 99–102. 
 161. Gaston, 357 F.3d at 82; see supra text accompanying notes 103–06. 
 162. Skelton & Connell, supra note 2, at 97. 
 163. Id. 
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of birth, address, height, and weight.164  However, strict adherence to such a 
requirement could render the routine booking exception underinclusive.  For 
example, one can imagine a situation in which a police officer asks a suspect a 
question that, although not explicitly biographical in nature, is still “necessary 
to complete booking or pretrial services.”165 
Alford v. State dealt with such a situation.166  In Alford, while searching a 
suspect during booking, an officer asked the suspect if he owned a flash drive 
the police discovered in the police car that the suspect had been transported to 
the station in.167  After the suspect confirmed that the flash drive was his, the 
officer cataloged it along with the rest of the suspect’s personal property.168  At 
the time of questioning, the police had not read the suspect his Miranda 
rights.169  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals applied the legitimate 
administrative function test and ruled that the officer’s question was exempt 
from the Miranda requirements under the routine booking exception.170  
However, had the court strictly restricted the exemption to inquiries seeking 
biographical data, the court would have suppressed the suspect’s response, 
despite the question’s direct relation to a legitimate administrative concern.171 
Instead, courts should adopt a slightly broader version of this restriction, 
limiting questions qualifying under the routine booking exception to those 
seeking information that the police need to complete booking paperwork.172  
                                                            
 164. Id. at 97–98; see also United States ex rel. Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1113 n.2. 
(2d Cir. 1975) (explaining that the exception should be limited to “simple identification 
information of the most basic sort”). 
 165. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990) (plurality opinion) (quoting Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 53, at 12). 
 166. See infra notes 168–71 and accompanying text. 
 167. Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 650–51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), cert. denied, 133 
S.Ct. 122 (2012).  Alford was originally arrested for evading arrest.  Id. at 650.  In addition to the 
flash drive, a plastic bag of ecstasy was also found in the police car.  Id. at 650–51.  Alford was 
subsequently indicted on an additional charge, possession of a controlled substance, and the court 
allowed the state to introduce statements regarding the flash drive at trial.  Id. at 651–52. 
 168. Id. at 651. 
 169. Id. at 650–51. 
 170. Id. at 662.  The court noted that the state “has a legitimate interest in identification and 
storage of an inmate’s property,” and that the officer’s question was reasonably related to this 
administrative concern.  Id. at 661–62. 
 171. See Skelton & Connell, supra note 2, at 97–98. 
 172. See United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 425 (6th Cir. 2008) (concluding that 
the routine booking exception should not apply because, among other reasons, the questioning at 
issue did not involve any “active documentation” of the suspect’s responses, such as the 
completion of booking paperwork); see also United States v. Guess, 756 F. Supp. 2d 730, 741 
(E.D. Va. 2010) (stating that the routine booking exception generally applies to information 
needed by police to complete booking paperwork or to comply with other mandatory booking 
procedures), cert. denied, 184 L. Ed. 2d 667 (2013); see also People v. Rodney, 85 648 N.E.2d 
471, 474 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that the suspect’s answer to the officer’s inquiry as to his 
employment status fell within the exception because, among other reasons, the question was “part 
of a routine booking form”). 
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Generally, completing booking paperwork requires police to obtain 
biographical information such as the arrestee’s name, date of birth, and 
address.173  However, in some jurisdictions the booking paperwork may 
require police to obtain additional information that is not strictly biographical 
in nature, such as an inventory of the arrestee’s property, as in Alford,174 or an 
emergency contact for the arrestee.175  Under the legitimate administrative 
function test, such information would be “reasonably relate[d] to a legitimate 
administrative concern” of the jail, and thus admissible absent a Miranda 
warning.176  This slightly more lenient limitation would allow courts to admit 
suspects’ answers to these legitimate (but non-biographical) questions, while 
simultaneously minimizing the possibility of abuse of the exception by 
providing police and courts with a clear basis for determining when a Miranda 
warning is necessary prior to questioning.177  In sum, questions must be 
reasonably related to a legitimate administrative function, must be asked at the 
station during the actual booking process, and must seek only the information 
necessary for police to complete any booking paperwork to qualify under the 
routine booking exception. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
It is clear that courts, attorneys, law enforcement officers, and suspects need 
clarification on the scope of the routine booking exception to Miranda.  The 
legitimate administrative function test will provide the necessary clarity in 
determining whether police must issue a Miranda warning prior to a routine 
booking inquiry.  This test is most consistent with previous statements by the 
Supreme Court on the routine booking exception, best promotes administrative 
efficiency at stationhouses and in courts, and most closely reflects the routine 
booking exception as originally conceived.  However, because of the risk of 
abuse by law enforcement of the routine booking exception, additional 





 173. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 661 (quoting 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 265.4(a)(11) (2008)) 
(“[T]he Texas Administrative Code requires that ‘[u]pon intake, a file on each inmate shall be 
established,’ which ‘shall include inmate property inventory.’”). 
 175. See, e.g., 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 265.4(a)(13) (requiring police to obtain upon intake 
the “name, address, and phone number of person to be contacted in event of emergency”). 
 176. See Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 660. 
 177. See supra Part III. 
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